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THE U.S. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT POLICY:
THE QUEST FOR UNIFORMITY
I. INTRODUCTION
Foreign direct investment' (FDI) "encompasses a range of business ac-
tivities with a common result: the exercise of some degree of management
or control over [an] enterprise by a foreign entity."2 Foreign investors find
investing in the United States advantageous for many economic and polit-
ical reasons. Recent currency fluctuations have essentially lowered the
price of U.S. companies to foreign investors. In addition, lower production
costs in the United States in relation to rising real wages, falling productiv-
ity, and increased taxes abroad make the United States attractive to foreign-
ers.3 Investors are also attracted to the relatively limited government
intervention in industry, as well as the political stability of the United States
government.4 Foreign manufacturers can also avoid some of the effects of
protectionist legislation by manufacturing goods in the United States rather
than abroad.5 This allows foreign investors to tap into American commer-
cial, financial, and labor markets for resources, opportunities, and technical
information that are not available when dealing from their home country.6
Despite these economic and political advantages, foreigners are not buying
U.S. companies at random simply because they are "good buys."7 Rather,
foreign investors generally concentrate on a handful of key areas of interest
to them.8
1. The most prevalent form of direct investment is the creation of multinational enterprises
through acquisition of existing businesses. Direct investment also includes joint ventures and the
establishment of new foreign-owned businesses, which may or may not be integrated into an ex-
isting multinational organization. Richard W. Shepro, Foreign Direct Investment in the United
States: A Legal Analysis, 4 Wis. INT'L L.J. 46, 48 (1986).
2. Id. at 47. The United States government, however, limits this definition to ownership or
control of 10% or more of an enterprise's voting securities. 15 C.F.R. § 806.15(a)(1) (1991).
3. HARVEY A. PONIACHEK, DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 15
(1986).
4. Id.
5. For example, goods manufactured in the United States by foreign-held businesses are
treated as "American" under the Buy American Act, which requires the federal government to
buy American goods for public use within the United States. See Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C.
§ 10(a)-(d) (1988).
6. As noted by Shepro, "many foreign drug companies have U.S. research and development
arms to take advantage of the large supply of U.S. Ph.D's." Shepro, supra note 1, at 48 n.8.
7. Edward J. Ray, A Profile of Recent Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S., 516 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 50, 61 (1991).
8. Id. For example, Japan has concentrated on research and development of intensive manu-
facturing interests, where substantial production gains are realized through the expansion of ex-
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Although many countries have recently increased their investments in
the United States, American politicians have expressed particular concern
over the number of American businesses acquired by the Japanese, and
many have blamed the Japanese for domestic economic trouble.9 This be-
came especially noticeable in the 1992 election-year use of Japanese inves-
tors as "scapegoats." °10 By emphasizing the trade imbalance and ignoring
the immense potential impact on U.S. employment and economic growth,
protectionists' tried to brainwash the average American into believing that
the United States needs to end traditional free trade policies.12 Calling for
the institution of a "Buy American" ethic and the return of corporate own-
ership to U.S. entities, 3 many "Buy American" boosters insisted the move-
ment was not "Japan bashing," but was rooted in deep concern for the
ailing U.S. economy. 4 While this debate has diminished somewhat since
the election, many have criticized President Bill Clinton for his failure to
commit consistently to a free trade stance.' 5
Clinton's position, however, is fairly representative of the current U.S.
policy-there is no longer a clear-cut answer whether a specific investment
transaction is within the confines of U.S. law.' 6 Since the "average Ameri-
can" does not understand the necessity for foreign investment,' 7 and the
current policy is susceptible to change based upon constituent uproar, a
isting plants and the creation of new facilities. EDWARD M. GRAHAM & PAUL R. KRUGMAN,
FOREIGN DEBT INVESTMENT IN THE U.S. 60 (1989).
9. See infra notes 35-49 and accompanying text.
10. Kenneth T. Walsh et al., The "America First"Fallacies, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb.
3, 1992, at 22.
11. See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
12. The Democratic "candidates were vying over who can deliver the harshest words and the
strongest promises about giving America a leg up in world economic competition." David E.
Rosenbaum & Keith Bradsher, Candidates Playing to Mood of Protectionism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
26, 1992, at Al. But see Walsh et al., supra note 10, at 22 (asserting that the current protectionist
movement is much more than mere "talk").
13. Kevin Anderson & Denise Kalette, Movement Heats Up to Buy American: Consumers
Doing Their "Little Bit," USA TODAY, Jan. 24, 1992, at IA.
14. Id. Economists and politicians agree that the protectionist movement has gained strength
due to the "flagging economy and the loss of high-paying American manufacturing jobs in the
automobile, steel and other industries to [countries] where markets are not as open as they are
here." Rosenbaum & Bradsher, supra note 12, at A2.
15. See, e.g., Morton M. Kondracke, Clinton Shifts Again: From Free Trade to Managed
Trade, ROLL CALL, Apr. 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, PAPERS File.
16. In addition to the regulations described below, foreign investors are subject to the same
takeover regulations as their domestic counterparts. See Edward F. Greene, Regulatory and Leg-
islative Responses to Takeover Activity in the 1980s: The United States and Europe, 69 TEX. L.
REV. 1539, 1540-59 (1991) (discussing federal antitakeover regulations, which are applicable to
both foreign and domestic investors).
17. See infra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
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renewed "Buy American" movement could backfire if it becomes "fodder
for a move towards protectionism." 8
The continuing controversy over foreign investment has touched off a
political debate that focuses not merely on the overall merits of foreign in-
vestment, but also on a multitude of peripheral issues. Common concerns
include: the acknowledged data gap regarding the extent and effect of for-
eign investments; the anticompetitive practices of some foreign investors
who purchase American companies to acquire technology, thereby placing
U.S. national security at risk; the increased competition among states to
boost their local economies through foreign investment; and the lack of
legal reciprocity in most foreign nations. 9 To counteract these inconsisten-
cies, the federal government must uniformly implement standards in sup-
port of traditional U.S. free trade policy. At the same time, the federal
government needs to instill an understanding among American workers and
business owners that our business relationships with Japan and other for-
eign nations can remain an asset rather than become a liability, if the proper
approach is used not only toward foreign investment but in all international
business transactions.
This Comment will address the protectionist or free trade controversy in
the United States as it pertains to foreign direct investment, emphasizing
the ignorance of many current American attitudes toward increased Japa-
nese investment. Part II will discuss the currently vague federal policy to-
ward foreign direct investment and the impact of fluctuating American
views toward such investment. Part III will discuss the role of the states in
encouraging foreign direct investment and the current competition among
states vying for local investment. Part IV will discuss the need for a uni-
form national standard that will withstand potential changes in the execu-
tive branch and counteract short-term changes in public attitude. Finally,
Part V will examine the options for a restructured policy that will afford
American businesses and workers an opportunity to profit from foreign
investment.
II. FEDERAL RESPONSES TO FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
The federal government derives its constitutional power to regulate FDI
from the Commerce Clause, which specifically grants Congress the power
18. Anderson & Kalette, supra note 13, at 1A.
19. MARTIN TOLCHIN & SusAN TOLCHIN, BUYING INTO AMERICA: How FOREIGN MONEY
IS CHANGING THE FACE OF OUR NATION 27 (1988).
1993]
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to "regulate Commerce with foreign [n]ations."2 ° The Supreme Court
stated that this constitutional power is "not merely an authorization to
Congress to enact laws ... but by its own force created an area of trade free
from interference by the States .... [T]he Commerce Clause even without
implementing legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the power of the
States."2 1 Therefore, federal responsibility for foreign investment policy
was clearly anticipated by the Constitution. Congress, however, has failed
to provide laws that are capable of consistent enforcement within the execu-
tive branch and, as a result, a dangerously ambiguous overall policy is in
effect.
A. Open or Free Trade v. Protectionism
The United States has long advocated free trade policies;22 in fact, every
President since Herbert Hoover has taken a free trade stance.23 These
traditional objectives regarding FDI were reiterated by President Ronald
Reagan:
[T]he United States believes that its direct investment abroad should
also receive fair, equitable, and non-discriminatory treatment....
[T]he United States seeks to... foster a domestic economic climate
in the United States which is conducive to investment, ensure that
foreign investors receive fair and equitable treatment under our stat-
utes and regulations, and maintain only those safeguards on foreign
investment which are necessary to protect our security and related
interests.24
In continued support of these objectives, President George Bush de-
clared that his administration would "continue to resist calls for protection
and managed trade... [including] any attempts to hinder the free interna-
tional flows of investment capital, which have benefitted workers and con-
sumers here and abroad."2 In addition, President Bush emphasized the
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also MICHAEL CONANT, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
ECONOMY 87-114 (1991) (discussing the Commerce Clause and the role of the federal government
in regulating interstate and foreign commerce).
21. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946) (citations omitted).
22. See generally TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN, supra note 19, at 275-78 (briefly detailing the history
of U.S. foreign investment policy).
23. Rosenbaum & Bradsher, supra note 12, at Al.
24. Statement of the President Transmitting International Investment Policy, 19 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1214, 1216-17 (Sept. 9, 1983).
25. President's Message to Congress Transmitting the 1990 Economic Report, 26 WEEKLY
COMP. PRE. Doc. 180, 183 (Feb. 6, 1990).
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United States commitment to reducing existing barriers to internatiorial in-
vestment throughout the world.26
President Clinton, on the other hand, has been criticized for his failure
to commit consistently to a free trade stance.27 His policy on Japanese in-
vestment appears to sway somewhere between a free trade stance and a
"managed" trade stance. While critics claim that this position is inconsis-
tent and that the President "needs to pick a side," his policy parallels cur-
rent U.S. laws. These laws make it difficult to define the "sides," bringing
to light the ongoing battle between protectionism and free trade and the
question of whether holding to a strict view of either position is possible in
light of the current world marketplace.28
Advocates for a continued open trade policy argue that the United
States needs foreign investment not only to expand the U.S. economy, but
also to resolve current international debt problems.29 FDI supporters em-
phasize the creation of jobs, the introduction of new technology, and the
consumer benefits realized through increased competition that are associ-
ated with FDI. In addition to the quantitative effects on U.S. employment
and income, FDI can act as a "catalyst," 0 and as a result, "foreign mul-
tinationals may revitalize American industry by introducing new technol-
ogy, managerial skills, and labor practices."31
The free trade view has historically been criticized by advocates of an
alternative political view known as "protectionism." The protectionist view
sees FDI as a threat to economic independence, political sovereignty, and
national security.32 Historically, the main political threats to free trade
have arisen because of a fear of job loss.3 3 Today, however, dissatisfaction
also results from a growing concern over stagnant real wages and incomes
in the United States and the lack of available "good jobs at good wages." 34
26. Id For a complete discussion of the current movement toward reciprocity, see infra
notes 142-56 and accompanying text.
27. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. President Clinton campaigned wholeheartedly
as a free trade advocate and consistently emphasized his aversion to protectionist policies.
28. See, eg., Jonathan A. Knee, Polar Opposites on Foreign Investment, TEXAS LAW., Feb. 1,
1993, at 17.
29. See, e.g., Statement of the President Transmitting International Investment Policy, supra
note 24, at 1214.
30. Id. at 1215.
31. NORMAN J. GLICKMAN & DOUGLAS P. WOODWARD, THE NEW COMPETITORS: How
FOREIGN INVESTORS ARE CHANGING THE U.S. ECONOMY 124 (1989).
32. Cheryl Tate, Note, The Constitutionality of State Attempts to Regulate Foreign Invest-
ment, 99 YALE L.J. 2023, 2023 (1990).
33. RUDIGER W. DORNBUSCH ET AL., AN AMERICAN TRADE STRATEGY: OPTIONS FOR
THE 1990s, at 2 (Robert Z. Laurance & Charles L. Schultze eds., 1990).
34. Id. at 3.
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These protectionists mistakenly believe that if foreign investment is not
curbed, U.S. workers will continue to lose out as Japanese firms "outhustle"
the American competition." This contention, however, can be refuted by
evidence of Japanese capital that has funded many new plants and sup-
ported many local economies.36
B. The Debate over Japanese FDI
Protectionist sentiment has been fueled by the recent American obses-
sion with the Japanese. Part of the U.S. fascination may have originated
because the Japanese have been the most publicized competition to U.S.-
based firms. As a result, there is natural curiosity whether Japanese success
can be repeated here.37 However, this curiosity has turned into an irra-
tional fear that the Japanese will take over the United States. Former Presi-
dent Bush recently acknowledged this trend:
Some have rather cynically said, well, Japan's going to own all of the
United States. My view is, I support Japanese investment in our
country. It results in competitiveness. It results in productivity in-
creasing in our country. If they can come in and show us a better
way to run a [business], the guy next door is going to have to do a
better job, or his [business] is going to go down.38
This statement also reflects the traditional U.S. policy discussed previously.
Despite historic executive support for free trade, protectionist sentiment
was still alive and well in the politics of the 1992 election. What the candi-
dates offered in their commercials, however, was "more emotion than logic,
[and] more oratory than substance."'39 Regardless of the fact that "[i]f you
tally all the economic benefits [of] free trade and all the benefits from pro-
tection, free trade generally comes out ahead,"' politicians exploited the
sense that Americans were being treated unfairly in international trade, es-
pecially by the Japanese. 41 Because American "politics is fueled by votes,
not theories, '4 2 many Americans received false information regarding for-
eign investment and continue to feel threatened by Japanese investors.
35. GLICKMAN & WOODWARD, supra note 31, at 220.
36. The Japanese accounted for $9.1 billion in manufacturing and new plant expansion in the
United States between the years of 1979 and 1987. Ray, supra note 7, at 60-61.
37. GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 8, at 18.
38. President's Remarks and an Exchange with Soviet Journalists on the Upcoming Moscow
Summit, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1057, 1061 (July 25, 1991).
39. Rosenbaum & Bradsher, supra note 12, at Al.
40. Id. at A2.
41. A New York Times-CBS News Poll taken in November 1991 showed that 32% of Ameri-




"With the buyouts of firms ranging from CBS Records to Talbots to
Thermos, there is hardly an industry in America untouched by Japanese
money."43 However, Japan is not the largest foreign investor in the United
States,' thereby proving that the notion of "a potential Japanese takeover
of [America] has little to do with actual facts."'4 Therefore, to calm
America's irrational fears, it is also important to note that "Japanese firms
show surprisingly little difference in their [ownership] behavior from other
foreign firms."46 In addition, Japanese "value added" and compensation
theories per worker and research and development efforts are similar to
those of other foreign-owned firms. The only behavioral difference appears
to be Japan's apparent higher propensity to import.47 This selection bias is
undoubtedly due to the Japanese corporate structure and ownership of a
"family" of intermingled manufacturers that rely on one another for busi-
ness.48 As a result, Japanese-owned corporations rely upon other Japanese
manufacturers with whom they already have a working relationship and to
whom they feel a sense of loyalty. However, as American suppliers are
purchased by or conduct business with other "family members," they be-
come integrated into the Japanese "family," providing potential for ex-
panded domestic consumption. 49
C. The Current Status of Federal FDI Regulations
1. Antitrust Laws
The Clayton Act5" is applicable to transactions involving acquisitions of
U.S. companies by either domestic or foreign corporations. Section 7 of the
Clayton Act is the principle antitrust statute applicable to mergers and ac-
quisitions in the United States. A Section 7 violation occurs when an acqui-
sition of all or part of the stock or assets of a "person" 51 engaged in
43. Business Tokyo Publishes the BT 100: The Definitive List of Japanese Investors in America,
Bus. Wire, Apr. 15, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File.
44. Ray, supra note 7, at 51.
45. Id. at 60.
46. GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 8, at 64.
47. Id.
48. See GLICKMAN & WOODWARD, supra note 31, at 295 (discussing the Japanese corporate
structure known as "keiretsu").
49. See id. (discussing the cross-fertility of U.S. and Japanese businesses).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1988).
51. The Clayton Act defines the term "person" to include the following: corporations and
associations existing under or authorized by the laws of the United States, the territories, the
states, or the laws of any foreign country. 15 U.S.C. § 12(a) (1988).
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commerce (or an activity affecting commerce) by another such "person"
substantially lessens competition or tends to create a monopoly.52
In determining whether a violation has occurred, the "market" involved
must be defined. This definition becomes more difficult, and essentially
more important when multinational corporations are involved.53 Once the
applicable market has been determined, the Clayton Act looks not only to
the present effect on competition, but also to the probable future effects of
an acquisition by prohibiting "anticompetitive acquisitions even where the
offending restraint of trade is only incipient at the time of suit."54
Section 7 claims can be brought by both the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and the Department of Justice. 5 In the alternative, private parties
may bring suit to "(1) prevent a hostile takeover, (2) challenge an acquisi-
tion involving competitors, (3) enjoin future acquisitions for a period of
years or (4) recover treble damages for antitrust injury sustained as a result
of unlawful acquisitions." 6 In order to bring a successful claim, a private
party must satisfy five elements: (1) the plaintiff must fall within the Act's
definition of "person" set forth above, (2) a violation of the "antitrust laws"
must have occurred, 57 (3) a direct injury must have been suffered by the
plaintiff, (4) the injury must have been caused by the violation charged, and
(5) the injury suffered must be measurable to some degree in dollars. 8
Where friendly acquisitions are in question, the parties involved may
seek an "advisory opinion" to determine if antitrust violations would result
from a proposed transaction. Both the Antitrust Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice and the FTC have procedures for "advance approval."59 It
is important to note, however, that this advice can be revoked.60 Addition-
ally, the involved parties may not be willing to release all relevant informa-
tion to the government prior to the transaction, raising doubts about the
accuracy of the advice.6
52. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
53. See Lawrence J. Hilton, Note, Antitrust and Foreign Competition: Proposals for a Dy-
namic Approach to Market Power Analysis, 26 TEx. INT'L L.J. 315 (1991) (discussing the difficul-
ties in multinational antitrust "market" determinations).
54. 3 JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 23.01,
at 23-6 (1993).
55. See 15 U.S.C. § 11(b), § 15 (1988).
56. 3 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 54, § 23.01, at 23-7.
57. Antitrust acts consist of the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and portions of the Wilson
Tariff Act.
58. 8 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 54, § 60.02[2], at 60-24.
59. See 16 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1993).
60. See 16 C.F.R. § 1.3 (1993).
61. See generally Marc Greidinger, The Exon-Florio Amendment: A Solution in Search of a
Problem, 6 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 111, 137-38 (1991).
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When investing in the United States, foreign corporations must realize
the consequences of antitrust violations and prepare accordingly for possi-
ble violations.62 This becomes especially important when Japanese corpora-
tions attempt hostile takeovers because the Japanese government rarely
enforces its antimonopoly law. As a result, Japanese investors may not be
aware of U.S. antitrust laws to help defend against the takeover of a U.S.
corporation, because there is no parallel enforcement in Japan.
2. Federal Entry Restrictions
Military and political interests are often protected by restrictions on for-
eign control of certain types of businesses.6 3 Since "foreign control" is not
uniformly defined, foreign investors must carefully investigate the scope of
these provisions when examining possible U.S. acquisitions in areas such as
natural resource excavation, communications, and national defense. For
example, the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920 contains a reciprocity pro-
vision that prohibits the Secretary of the Interior from granting excavation
leases to aliens whose nation does not allow "similar or like privileges" to
U.S. citizens or corporations."4 This can be especially important when na-
tions such as Japan are involved. Based on Japan's lack of internal natural
resources, coupled with its high demand for raw materials,65 these indus-
tries may seem attractive to Japanese investors. However, ownership of
these industries may be out of reach.
Federal restrictions on foreign ownership also protect industries vital to
the national defense when: (1) the industry provides materials required by
current defense contracts, or (2) the industry is crucial to the maintenance
of a healthy economy and the operation of the national government.66 For
example, the Atomic Energy Act of 195467 provides that while a foreign
entity may not obtain a controlling interest in a nuclear facility, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission may allow a foreign enterprise to maintain sub-
stantial interests in such facilities.6" The national defense considerations of
62. See Stephen M. Axinn, Techniques and Antitrust Aspects Concerning Foreign Entry, 43
FORDHAM L. REV. 741 (1975).
63. See generally Cecelia M. Waldeck, Proposals for Limiting Foreign Investment Risk Under
the Exon-Florio Amendment, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1175, 1190-94 (1991).
64. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1988).
65. "Japan is neither a natural-resource-based exporter nor, until possibly very recently, a
major participant in intra-industry trade." Gary R. Saxonhouse, Japan, S1I and the International
Harmonization of Domestic Economic Practices, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 450, 453 (1991).
66. Waldeck, supra note 63, at 1191.
67. Pub. L. No. 83-703, § 69, 68 Stat. 919, 934-35 (1955) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2099
(1988)).
68. Id.; see also Waldeck, supra note 63, at 1196.
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such restrictions are apparent. The Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) has also been granted discretionary power to protect national de-
fense. Under Section 310(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, the FCC
can bar ownership by refusing to issue licenses when "the public interest
will be served by the refusal or revocation of such license."' 69 This is based
"upon the idea of preventing alien activities against the government during
the time of war," thereby justifying the Atomic Energy Act on national
defense grounds.7°
As a result of these restrictions, Congress has allowed the federal gov-
ernment to use discretion when allowing foreign ownership. These restric-
tions are justified as safeguards to national defense and, as a result, cannot
be effectively contested. Therefore, foreign investors must be aware of fed-
eral entry restrictions for specific industries when intending to acquire en-
terprises of this nature.71
3. The Exon-Florio Amendment
Another area of legitimate U.S. concern is the purchase of high technol-
ogy industries by the Japanese. According to testimony at a House sub-
committee hearing, 163 United States high technology firms have been
purchased by six of the largest Japanese industry groups since 1988.72 The
Semi-Conductor Manufacturing Technology (SEMATECH) joint venture,
a consortium of government and private sector officials, recently provided
further evidence of how the Japanese are refusing to cooperate with Ameri-
can semiconductor manufacturers. 73 According to the report provided by
SEMATECH, Japanese suppliers are refusing to sell equipment containing
leading edge technology to U.S. companies. 74 "Even if American buyers
succeed in gaining access to such technology, it is priced at a premium and
often delivered late."'75 In support of this proposition, the report listed sev-
eral types of equipment that are not generally available to U.S. semiconduc-
tor manufacturers, but can be bought openly by Japanese producers. 76 This
loss of technology may be the price the United States pays for an influx of
69. Waldeck, supra note 63, at 1192 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(4) (1982)).
70. Id.
71. State restrictions also exist. See infra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
72. H.R. REP. No. 399, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 10 (1991).
73. SEMATECH released this information in a report titled, How the Japanese Are Sheltering
Key Technology, which was released at a May 6, 1991 press conference. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.




foreign dollars,77 but a continual loss of technology may be dangerous to
national security and cannot be tolerated. While these interests are more
adequately protected by other types of legislation,78 in recent years the pro-
tection of technology has been utilized as an excuse to try to close Ameri-
can markets to the Japanese and other foreign investors.
Although Congress was aware that FDI was drastically increasing in
the United States, the extent of these investments remained unknown until
Congress passed the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974. 79 This Act
authorized a Commerce Department survey of foreign investment activity
in the United States. 0 As a result of the data collected, Congress realized
the need for continual tracking of foreign investment and enacted the Inter-
national Investment Survey Act of 1976 (IISA).8 1 In addition to facilitating
the continued collection of FDI information, IISA enables the President to
"conduct a regular data collection program to secure current information
on international capital flows and other information related to international
investment. ' 82 This Act was not intended to restrain or deter foreign in-
vestment in the United States,83 but to keep the federal government ap-
praised of ongoing FDI transactions and "to provide analyses of such
information to the Congress, the executive agencies, and the general pub-
lic."'8 4 President Gerald Ford designated authority to the Department of
Commerce8 5 to conduct these surveys and created the Committee on For-
eign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) as an advisory agency.86
Through these measures, Congress and the President created a permanent
mechanism to monitor foreign investment activities in the United States.
Although there was an enormous amount of FDI in the following dec-
ade, Congress appeared content with this limited FDI policy. However, the
complete inability of the federal government to control foreign investment
became painfully obvious as a result of two events: (1) the attempted hos-
77. Stanley A. Weiss, National Security Putting Crimp in Foreign Investments, S.F. CHRON.,
Jan. 27, 1992, at A21.
78. See Robert S. Schwartz & Bennett A. Caplan, Conditioning the Unconditional, 210 N.Y.
L.J., Aug. 19, 1993, at 5; see also infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
79. Pub. L. No. 93-479, §§ 1-11, 88 Stat. 1450-54 (1974).
80. Pub. L. No. 93-479, §§ 1-11, 88 Stat. 1450-54 (1974).
81. Pub. L. No. 94-472, § 2, 90 Stat. 2059, 2059-64 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.
§§ 3101-3108 (1988)).
82. 22 U.S.C. § 3103(a)(1) (1988).
83. 22 U.S.C. § 3101(c) (1988).
84. 22 U.S.C. § 3101(b) (1988).
85. Exec. Order No. 11,961, 3 C.F.R. § 86 (1978), reprinted as amended in 3 C.F.R. § 147
(1978).
86. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (1975), reprinted as amended in 45 Fed.
Reg. 989 (1980).
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tile takeover of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company by British corporate
raider Sir James Goldsmith in 1986 and (2) the proposed purchase of
Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation by Fujitsu, Ltd. of Japan in 1987.
Despite Commerce Department concerns regarding competition and the
confidentiality of classified information,17 no U.S. agency had the power to
stop either acquisition, short of declaring a national emergency."8
Although both transactions dissolved prior to completion, 9 Senator J.
James Exon9 ° and Representative James J. Florio9 were concerned with
the government's potential inability to act under such circumstances. This
concern led to the introduction of the trade bill now known as the Exon-
Florio Amendment (EFA or "Amendment").92
The EFA was adopted on August 23, 1988, as Section 5021 of the 1988
Omnibus Trade Act.93 Generally, this Amendment to the Defense Produc-
tion Act of 195094 provides a mechanism for the federal government to
challenge mergers and acquisitions of U.S. corporations by foreign entities
when national security is at stake.95 The President, or a presidential desig-
87. Prior to the Goldsmith raid, Goodyear had an aerospace division that produced com-
puters, F-15 flight simulators, missile guidance systems, and other defense-related hardware. Ac-
quisitions by Foreign Companies, 1987 Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 16, 23 (1987).
88. The only action that could have been brought was on antitrust grounds. See Mark L.
Hanson, Comment, The Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment in the United States Defense
Industry, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 658, 662-63 (1989).
89. Fujitsu abandoned its quest, fearing political backlash as a result of the strong protection-
ist sentiment in the United States. See Thomas W. Soseman, Comment, International Law-The
Exon-Florio Amendment to the 1988 Trade Bill: A Guardian of National Security or a Protectionist
Weapon?, 15 J. CORP. L. 597, 599-600 (1990). Goldsmith's action was eventually halted by the
invocation of an antitakeover statute in Ohio. Goodyear's management then agreed to purchase
Goldsmith's shares at a premium. Id. at 600; see also Greene, supra note 16, at 1556-63 (discuss-
ing the effects of state antitakeover legislation).
90. Senator J. James Exon is a Democrat from Nebraska.
91. Representative James J. Florio, a Democrat from New Jersey, became governor of that
state in 1990.
92. 50 U.S.C. § 2170 (1988).
93. Omnibus Trade and Competitive Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1425 (1988)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. app.).
94. Defense Production Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-774, 64 Stat. 798 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. app.).
95. The Exon-Florio Amendment reads as follows:
§ 2170. Authority to review certain mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers
(a) Investigations
The President or the President's designee may make an investigation to determine the
effects on national security of mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers proposed or pending...
by or with foreign persons which could result in foreign control of persons engaged in
interstate commerce in the United States. If it is determined that an investigation should
be undertaken, it shall commence no later than 30 days after receipt by the President or the
President's designee of written notification of the proposed or pending merger, acquisition,
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nee, is authorized to conduct an investigation of a proposed acquisition of
an American "person"96 by a "foreign person."97 This investigation must
begin within thirty days of the President's receipt of voluntary written noti-
or takeover as prescribed by regulations promulgated pursuant to this section. Such inves-
tigation shall be completed no later than 45 days after such determination.
(b) Confidentiality of information
Any information or documentary material filed with the President or the President's
designee pursuant to this section shall... [not] be made public except as may be relevant
to any administrative or judicial action or proceeding. Nothing in this subsection shall be
construed to prevent disclosure to either House of Congress or to any duly authorized
committee or subcommittee of the Congress.
(c) Action by the President
Subject to subsection (d), the President may take such action for such time as the President
considers appropriate to suspend or prohibit any acquisition, merger, or takeover.., by or
with foreign persons so that such control will not threaten to impair the national security.
The President shall announce the decision to take action pursuant to this subsection not
later than 15 days after the investigation....
(d) Findings of the President
The President may exercise the authority conferred by subsection (c) only if the Presi-
dent finds that-
(1) there is credible evidence that leads the President to believe that the foreign interest
exercising control might take action that threatens to impair the national security, and
(2) provisions of law, other than this section and the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706), do not in the President's judgment provide adequate
and appropriate authority for the President to protect the national security in the matter
before the President....
(e) Factors to be considered
For purposes of this section, the President or the President's designee may, taking into
account the requirements of national security, consider among other factors-
(1) domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements,
(2) the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense require-
ments, including the availability of human resources, products, technology, materials, and
other supplies and services, and
(3) the control of domestic industries and commercial activity by foreign citizens as it
affects the capability and capacity of the United States to meet the requirements of national
security.
50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (1988).
96. The acquired "person" may be "of a variety of forms of ongoing or sustainable business
entities, including a corporation, a partnership, a division of a corporation, or an unincorporated
entity." H.R. CONF. RFP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 925, 926 (1987).
97. "Foreign person" is intended to include:
[A]ny individual who is not a U.S. citizen or a U.S. national under the laws of the United
States . . . [or] an entity organized under the laws of, or having its principal place of
business in a country other than the United States, provided such entity is directly or
indirectly controlled by a foreign person. It would also include any foreign person who,
for example, acquires a domestic corporation for the purpose of acquiring control of an-
other domestic corporation in contravention of the purposes of this [Amendment].
Id. at 925-26.
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fication of the proposed transaction98 and be completed forty-five days
thereafter. 99 During this investigation, the President must determine
whether there is credible evidence to support a finding that the change in
control may result in actions that threaten national security'00 and whether
any other legal provision' ° ' supplies the President with appropriate author-
ity to protect national security.'0 2
Based on the above criteria, the President may suspend or prohibit any
transaction, or limit the level of proposed foreign control. 03 If the parties
fail to report a transaction, the President may also order a foreign corpora-
tion to relinquish its control, making use of the phrase "voluntary notifica-
tion" somewhat inappropriate." 4 If the President deems action is
necessary, a written report of the results of the investigation and a state-
ment of the intended action must be transmitted to both the House and the
Senate. 10 5 Even though all information contained in this report is confiden-
tial, it may be released to other agencies when it is relevant to any adminis-
trative or judicial proceeding.' 0 6 In addition, the President may seek
appropriate relief'017 in the federal district courts to implement and enforce
the provisions of this Amendment in both the investigation and relief
stages.' 08
As stated above, the federal government retains the right to place "safe-
guards" on foreign investments when U.S. security is at risk. 10 9 Under the
EFA, the standard for transactional review is "national security," which is
not defined by the Amendment." 0 This definition was intentionally left
open to allow the President broad discretion in regulating foreign invest-
98. "Transaction" will hereinafter include mergers, acquisitions, or other business
combinations.
99. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a) (1988).
100. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(1) (1988).
101. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(2) (1988). The International Emergency Economic Powers
Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1988), may also provide presidential authority.
102. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(2) (1988).
103. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(c) (1988).
104. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(c) (1988).
105. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b) (1988).
106. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b) (1988).
107. "The term 'appropriate relief' is intended as a broad term to give the President flexibility
to deal with any foreign control attempt which the President deems to pose a threat to national
security.... [Such relief] includes broad injunctive and equitable relief including, but not limited
to divestment relief." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, supra note 96, at 927.
108. Id.
109. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
110. See Greidinger, supra note 61, at 121-35.
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ment matters. 11  Congress did, however, provide a list of suggested factors
to be taken into account by the President when making national security
determinations under the EFA. These include the domestic production
needed for projected national defense requirements and the capability of
domestic businesses to meet that demand.1 12
The current EFA is susceptible to abuse by both free trade advocates
and protectionists. Free trade advocates propose that the Amentment is
protectionist in nature and really does not have anything to do with na-
tional security as it claims. They assert that protectionists may see the EFA
as a vehicle to manipulate foreign ownership and control relying upon per-
ceived economic disadvantages as an element of national security. How-
ever, a protectionist administration has not been in power since the
implementation of the EFA, and thus the real question of abusive applica-
tion lies with future administrations. A protectionist administration may be
elected and, as a result, the federal government needs to make the now
overbroad EFA more defined.113 Additionally, an outburst of public senti-
ment may lead to presidential abuse of the vague standards set forth under
the EFA.
Future free trade administrations may recognize the invisible bounda-
ries of the national security standard in order to preserve the inflow of capi-
tal. These boundaries, however, may be too narrow to protect technology
vital to national security. As of November 26, 1991, more than 650 notices
of foreign acquisition have been provided to CFIUS under the EFA.114
However, only thirteen investigations and one divestiture have been ordered
to date.115 This can be attributed to the Reagan and Bush Administrations'
dedication to retaining free trade.116 It is also possible, however, that neces-
111. Although the conferees did not intend to authorize investigations of foreign acquisitions
that are "outside the realm of national security," the national security standard should be "inter-
preted broadly without limitation to particular industries." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, supra note
96, at 926. Moreover, the Conference Report states that "[tihe Conferees recognize that the term
'national security' is not a defined term in the Defense Production Act... [and they do not mean]
to imply any limitation on the term 'national defense' as used elsewhere in the... Act." Id.
112. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e) (1988).
113. The 1992 presidential candidates who openly advocated free trade were Paul Tsongas
and George Bush. Tom Harkin, Bob Kerrey, and Pat Buchanan, on the other hand, emphasized
the need for protectionism. Bill Clinton claimed to remain neutral. See Rosenbaum & Bradsher,
supra note 12, at Al-2. But see Kondracke, supra note 15 (stating that Clinton campaigned as a
free trade advocate).
114. H.R. RP. No. 399, supra note 72, at 6.
115. Id. at 6-7; see Joseph E. Reece, Buyer Beware: The United States No Longer Wants
Foreign Capital to Fund Corporate Acquisitions, 18 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 279, 294-301
(1990) (discussing the prior investigations and the divesture proceeding that have taken place
under the EFA).
116. See supra notes 22-36 and accompanying text.
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sary actions are being overlooked due to the vague standards set forth in the
current EFA.
This concern stems from a recent discovery made by the Subcommittee
on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competition regarding U.S. pro-
duction of semiconductors in the aftermath of the Gulf War, when it was
realized that the domestic semiconductor industry would not have been
able to support the demand of the United States had the war continued.1 17
Since the EFA went into effect in 1988, eighty-five American-owned semi-
conductor material and equipment manufacturers have been sold to foreign
investors, more than sixty of which were sold to Japanese firms.11 The
Administration testified that had the United States not been able to obtain
semiconductors from a foreign source throughout the Gulf War, it would
have taken six months to put domestic semiconductor manufacturing "on-
stream" to meet U.S. defense needs. 1 9 This six-month deficiency would
not only have prolonged the conflict; it would have cost American lives. 
120
This is one of the situations the EFA was designed to protect against. De-
spite the above-mentioned problems with the current EFA, its "sunset
clause" was recently removed from the statute, thereby making it a perma-
nent part of U.S. foreign investment law. 121
III. STATE RESPONSES TO FDI
The Supreme Court has said that states "may not tell this Nation or
Japan how to run their foreign policies." 122 However, "[n]o one questions
the fact that the states now lead the nation in shaping foreign investment
policy.... They [have] provided the leadership, dictated the parameters of
the issue, and persuaded their legislatures to allocate resources earmarked
for recruiting foreign capital." 123 These are three of the very steps that
Congress has failed to take. By organizing promotional agencies and pro-
posing individual regulations, the states are testing the vague federal FDI
policy. However, they may also be sending mixed signals to foreign
investors.
117. "Iraq had bought United States companies with needed equipment and technology, and
had stolen components from nuclear weapons of other countries. Rarely in world history had the
strength of an aggressor country depended so heavily on technology, equipment and other re-




121. Defense Production Act Extension and Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-99, § 8,
105 Stat. 487.
122. Japan Line Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 455 (1979).
123. TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN, supra note 19, at 34.
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A. State Promotional Agencies
Support for the free trade sentiment is evidenced by the growing
number of states hoping to increase the amount of inward FDI by offering
incentives to foreign investors. By 1979, forty-seven states had established
agencies in foreign countries to disseminate information to potential foreign
investors on local markets, business conditions, and export opportunities. 24
These promotional agencies have been particularly concerned with encour-
aging Japanese investment, and many state governors now work directly
with the Japanese to encourage both new and continuing investment.12 5
Several states have offered incentives to attract foreign investors. The
incentives include "tax breaks, grants, low-interest bond financing, loans
and loan guarantees, employee training site and access improvements, land
grants, and special lease promotions." '26 An additional incentive that be-
came increasingly popular in the late 1980s was the "Japanese school."
Designed to help Japanese workers and their families learn English and ad-
just to life in the United States, as well as to help Japanese children retain
their traditional values, these schools offer inexpensive incentives to pro-
mote investment. 27 While foreign investors rarely base their investment
decisions solely on these types of incentives, "[i]ncentives are, if anything tie
breakers in stage two of the location decision process."12 8
On its face, this appears to be a step in furthering the open trade policy
that the federal government purports to advocate, but state encouragement
of foreign investment may be going beyond constitutionally allowable state
action. As stated above, the U.S. position on foreign investment supports
the view that all corporations should be treated equal-regardless of the
nationality of corporate ownership.12 9 Many states have gone beyond the
boundaries of this view by offering incentives solely to foreign investors and,
as a result, some foreign corporations may be receiving more favorable
treatment than their domestic counterparts. These state promotional activi-
ties may be sending mixed messages to foreign investors. "[A]ttempts by
most of the State governments to attract foreign investments blur the
boundary between international and domestic economic interests and could
complicate the efforts of the federal government to negotiate with foreign
124. GLICKMAN & WOODWARD, supra note 31, at 233.
125. Id
126. Id. at 235.
127. "Kentucky promised to spend $5 million over 20 years for schools for Japanese employ-
ees of Toyota." Id.
128. Id. at 228.
129. See supra notes 22-36 and accompanying text.
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governments to reduce incentives for and restrictions on foreign direct
investment." 130
B. State Attempts to Regulate
Concurrent with such promotional activities, some state governments
have responded to pressure from worried constituents by proposing a vari-
ety of legislative measures. In so doing, states are testing the federal gov-
ernment's tolerance of state-imposed protectionism. The concerns of the
states undoubtedly mirror those of the federal government. However, con-
gressional failure to provide a national standard has prompted these state
proposals to appease the public. These proposals range from mere registra-
tion requirements to blanket reciprocity and approval requirements."'
However, when considering legislation, the states must concern themselves
with the limitations imposed by the Constitution and the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court has made the distinction between pure protectionist
legislation, which on its face discriminates against foreigners and is subject
to a "virtually per se rule of invalidity," 132 and mere burdens on the free
flow of trade, which may pass constitutional scrutiny.1 33 In order to deter-
mine valid interstate regulations, several criteria have been provided by the
Supreme Court. The proposed regulation must: (1) have a "substantial
nexus" with the regulating state, (2) be substantially apportioned so that it
does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and (3) be fairly related
to the services provided by the state. 134 Since the Supreme Court places the
highest scrutiny on measures that restrict foreign commerce, 135 additional
challenges to these state regulations have been imposed. State regulations
may not duplicate federal regulations. Additionally, these regulations must
not hinder the nation from "speak[ing] with one voice" regarding FDI
transactions. 136 If these criteria are met, the transaction will pass the judi-
130. Tate, supra note 32, at 2030 n.531 (citation omitted).
131. See id. at 2027-28 (providing examples of state regulations proposed in 1989).
132. City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
133. Id. at 623-24.
134. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
135. "Facial discrimination by itself may be a fatal defect; but at minimum, such facially
discriminatory statutes invoke the strictest scrutiny." Id. at 337.
136. For example, state governments have tried to impose statutes that tax the worldwide
incomes of corporations within their states. The Supreme Court has ruled that if a state tax is
"applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does
not discriminate against interstate commerce and is fairly related to the services provided by the
State," it will be upheld. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). In
relation to foreign commerce, however, there is the added criteria of 1) whether there is a risk of
multiple taxation and 2) whether the tax prevents the government from "speak[ing] with one voice
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cially imposed constitutional scrutiny test, unless the action is pre-empted
by federal law. 37
As a result, the only currently valid state impairments to foreign invest-
ment are entry-level restrictions, which states can justify on various eco-
nomic and political grounds. For example, since real property ownership is
largely a matter of state law, states can limit or prohibit foreign ownership
of agricultural land. Foreign investors must check existing state restrictions
carefully and confirm early in the investment process that no prohibitive
legislation is pending, since state legislatures are becoming more creative in
justifying restrictions against foreign investment. 3
IV. How Do WE MOVE FROM HYPOCRISY TO UNIFORMITY?
As stated above,139 Congress has failed to "[provide] the leadership,
[dictate] the parameters of the issue, and [persuade] ... legislatures to allo-
cate resources earmarked for recruiting foreign capital."" However, as a
result of proposed state actions, the federal government should be receiving
a message to take charge of its constitutionally imposed duty to create a
consistent federal policy on foreign investment.
In working toward a uniform policy on FDI, however, several factors
must be taken into consideration. It is clear that the nation as a whole is
concerned with the issues of security and reciprocity, especially as these
factors relate to the Japanese. These issues must be reconciled by a uniform
national policy on foreign investment to save the reputation of the United
States as a free trade nation. The promotional activities of the states should
provide enough evidence to Congress that free trade sentiment is alive in
American society. However, the federal government needs to curb
favorable treatment of foreign corporations and reassure domestic corpora-
tions that equal treatment is promoted. An additional problem with cur-
rent state encouragement is the failure of such programs to foster
reciprocity. Incentives should be provided to promote the opening of mar-
kets in other countries, rather than providing blanket incentives to increase
inward foreign investment. Incentives for reciprocity should be advocated
by the federal government; however, a message must also be sent back to
the states that protectionism will not be tolerated by the federal govern-
when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments." Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages,
423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976).
137. See generally CONANT, supra note 20, at 9-44 (discussing the structure of the Constitu-
tion and its role in economic decisions).
138. See generally Tate, supra note 32.
139. See supra part III.
140. TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN, supra note 19, at 34.
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ment. Although the future of proposed state legislation is uncertain, the
importance of such bills cannot be diminished; they evidence a hasty polit-
ical response to short-term protectionist sentiment among constituents.
Keeping these objectives in mind, the federal government must decide
whether reciprocity is the answer or whether clarification and increased en-
forcement of existing laws are necessary for universal application of a U.S.
policy.
A. The Debate over Reciprocity
1. Is Legal Reciprocity the Answer?
Even with the EFA in place, "the United States is still a long way from
the substantive preacquisition reviews that some other countries have im-
posed on foreign bidders, to say nothing of the laws in some countries that
in effect require foreign investors to bring in local partners."'' Since the
United States is an attractive investment ground for foreigners who would
not allow the same transactions to take place in their own countries, both
protectionists and free trade advocates agree that some form of reciprocity
should be encouraged. However, their definitions of reciprocity are vastly
different because they are motivated by different beliefs.
"The traditional U.S. position is one that advocates right of establish-
ment together with national treatment; that is, a firm from one country
should have the unimpeded ability to establish subsidiaries in other coun-
tries, and once established, these subsidiaries should receive the same treat-
ment as domestic firms."' 42 Therefore, under traditional policy, treatment
of firms operating in the United States should be neutral, without bias for or
against foreign ownership of U.S. productive assets. Free traders, on the
other hand, do not seek to limit the incoming FDI, but encourage other
nations to open their markets and, thereby, increase the amount of U.S.
investment is emphasized.
Protectionists argue that the United States should limit FDI transac-
tions to include only such transactions that would be allowed by the inves-
tor's home country. For example, a bill introduced in Congress in 1980
would have amended securities laws to restrict acquisitions of public com-
panies by non-U.S. corporations.1 43 Unless the laws and regulations of the
bidder's country allowed a U.S. corporate acquisition under similar circum-
stances, the foreign entities would not have been afforded purchasing rights
141. LEO HERZEL & RICHARD W. SHEPRO, BIDDERS AND TARGETS: MERGERS AND AC-
QUISITIONS IN THE U.S. 98 (1990).
142. GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 8, at 72.
143. See H.R. REP. No. 7750, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
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in the U.S.. 1" This bill never passed, demonstrating congressional recogni-
tion that the United States should not close its barriers, but rather should
encourage other nations to open their markets.
An additional protectionist argument provides that foreign investors
should be subject to the laws of their home country with respect to U.S.
transactions.14 5 If this definition "were applied literally and consistently on
both sides, certain types of foreign investment could actually receive more
favorable treatment under the law than would domestically controlled com-
petitors."" Under this theory, however, "selective" reciprocity is actually
advocated, in that reciprocity exists only when U.S. firms in the home coun-
try are more regulated than these same firms in U.S. markets. In effect, the
stricter of the two laws is applied against the foreign investor. It is clear
that this standard would discourage FDI and is therefore against the stated
U.S. policy.
2. Attempting "Cultural Reciprocity"
Because of the discretionary nature of both the EFA and other restric-
tions on FDI, changing attitudes toward the Japanese and the traditional
policy may sway decisions. Therefore, the protectionist xenophobia toward
Japan, which periodically sweeps the country, is a potential cultural impedi-
ment to foreign investment. Such an effect, resulting from the EFA, needs
to be eliminated. However, it is questionable whether elimination of nega-
tive attitudes toward the Japanese would in itself remove the problems of
discretion within the EFA. After all, "[t]o the extent that foreign investors
behave like locals but bring about superior performance, [it is questionable]
whether, at the end of the day, the nationality of firms actually matters all
that much." 147
In the United States, however, it appears that the more visible the for-
eign investment and the foreign investors are, the greater the American
anxieties surrounding them.148 For example, "[t]he same amount of money
spent by the Japanese on Rockefeller Center and Pebble Beach would ar-
guably have been much less troublesome had it been less conspicuous prop-
erty and less conspicuous investors." '149 However, the United States is not
144. Id.
145. GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 8, at 117.
146. Id.
147. Theodore H. Moran, Foreign Acquisitions of Critical U.S. Industries: Where Should the
United States Draw the Line?, WASH. Q., Spring 1993, at 61, 64.
148. Leroy 0. Laney, The Impact of U.S. Laws on Foreign Direct Investment, 516 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. ScI. 144, 150-51 (1991).
149. Id. at 151.
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likely to commit political suicide by restraining the purchase power of spe-
cific nationalities. 5 0 Also, Japanese influence on American industry cannot
be ignored, since it will continue to grow.' 5 1 It is conceivable that future
laws may restrict the sale of "certain nationally historic or otherwise valua-
ble property."' 152
It appears that the legal reciprocity that many Americans are pushing
for is not the answer to effectively restricting U.S. markets or making ac-
cess to Japanese markets easier for U.S. businesses. Since reciprocal xeno-
phobia is an obvious barrier to investment in both countries, reciprocity in
cultural understanding appears to facilitate a better overall solution to the
investment problems between the United States and Japan. Through the
concept of negotiation, Americans may be able to successfully invest in Ja-
pan and better accept the terms of a Japanese investment. In the process,
some of the aversion to the Japanese may be overcome, further increasing
the likelihood of successful transactions.
The Japanese will also need to make a few adjustments if they have any
hope of continued investment in the United States. Despite the reputed
Japanese business savvy, as the Japanese "become more firmly entrenched
in America, Japanese firms may start to act more like the typical American
company next door, acquiring the sensitivity needed to avoid lawsuits and,
like other foreign multinationals, allowing American managers to control
their piece of the pie."' 153 Although the Japanese may continue to invest
much needed capital in U.S. corporations, in order to overcome American
animosity the Japanese will need to exert more tact when publicizing acqui-
sitions of American companies. 154 Willingness to share information will
also be important in high technology areas if investment is to be continued
in these industries. It is clear, however, that "whether with arms out-
stretched or folded firmly in defiance, more Americans will have to get used
to working with the Japanese."' 1
55
B. Clarification and Enforcement of Existing Law
While cultural understanding can only help facilitate a better business
relationship with the Japanese, one must take "seriously the possibility that
Japan ... might someday become a military enemy of the United States."' 6
150. Id.
151. Business Tokyo, supra note 43.
152. Laney, supra note 148, at 151.
153. Business Tokyo, supra note 43.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Moran, supra note 147, at 62.
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As a result, it is necessary to keep laws in place to protect the technological
future of the United States. However, the EFA in its current state provides
"a dull weapon at best." '157 As a result, the existing policy needs to be
modified and stronger safeguards must be implemented.
1. Clearly Defining National Security
It has been argued that "it is often more difficult for an overseas com-
pany to buy a U.S. product containing sensitive technology than to
purchase the entire company that makes the product."158 This may be true
based on the current state of the law and, as a result, many Americans are
encouraging Congress to resolve the vagueness of the current federal pol-
icy. 159 This vagueness also causes problems for investors, since many firms
that are not critical to national security feel obligated to report their invest-
ments to CFIUS, creating unnecessary transactional delays." This makes
it harder for U.S. corporations to attract foreign bidders and, in effect, the
EFA is deterring FDI in industries outside the scope of what the EFA in-
cluded. Therefore, critics of the EFA are trying to tell the United States
that "[o]nly a clear definition [of national security] will put teeth in the law
to protect critical technologies while keeping the welcome mat out for for-
eign investment."1 61
Foreign nations have also pushed for a clarification of the U.S. standard.
The Japanese have failed to comment on the EFA, but the European Com-
munity (EC) has been particularly disturbed by the potential inconsistency
of U.S. policy. Although "the EC in no way contests the right of any coun-
try to take such measures as are necessary to defend its national secur-
ity,"1 6 the EC has stressed its concern about the "'potentially very wide'
scope" of the EFA, stating that the EC considers the possibility of protec-
tionism "very serious indeed." '163 If the United States entertains hopes of
entering into a trade agreement with the EC, the U.S. government had bet-
ter heed the EC's warning.1 64
157. Ellison F. McCoy, The Reauthorization of the Exon-Florio: A Battle Between Spurring
the U.S. Economy and Protecting National Security, 22 GA. J. INT'L & ComP. L. 685, 699 (1992).
158. Moran, supra note 147, at 62.
159. See generally McCoy, supra note 157.
160. Weiss, supra note 77, at A21.
161. Id.
162. These concerns were recently expressed by David Tirr, a top EC official. EC Complains
of Uncertainty Associated with Exon-Florio, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 300 (Feb. 19,
1992).
163. Id. at A3.
164. "While the EC is not asking that the law be amended," it has been suggested that there
is "room to explore the national security concept." Id.
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The Technology Preservation Act of 1991165 (TPA or "Act") was intro-
duced in the House of Representatives on June 12, 1991, to ensure that
transactions "vital to United States national security are thoroughly investi-
gated, and that any threats to national security that might arise from such
combinations are effectively remedied and prevented." 16 6 Although the
EFA's national security standard was retained under the TPA, this Act
proposed several significant changes to the EFA. One important addition
would have granted the CFIUS powers concurrent with those of the Presi-
dent and enabled CFIUS to direct the involved parties to delay their final
transaction until an investigation could be completed.1 67 The Act would
have also granted the President the additional authority to direct parties to
"unwind" completed deals. This unwinding would have removed any in-
centive for American owners to speed up a sale to avoid having the sale
blocked under the EFA. 168 Additionally, the problem of the foreign pur-
chaser finding a suitable buyer through divestiture procedures would have
been avoided.169 Finally, the TPA would have allowed the President to
require "assurances" from foreign persons that their control of a U.S. firm
would not impair the national security of the United States. 7 '
Additional factors were also provided for the President to consider
when making national security determinations. The most important of
these was the capability and capacity of foreign-owned or foreign-controlled
firms located within the United States to meet the national defense require-
ments. This section of the Act addressed the Gulf War semiconductor issue
discussed earlier in this Comment. 17'
The most significant portion of the TPA, however, was a move toward
an increased understanding of the effects of foreign ownership and control
on American industries that are vital to national security. Under the Act,
the President would have been required to conduct a study to determine
what, if any, technologies or types of U.S. firms should be preserved for
research and development and production, and to what extent foreign in-
vestment is a factor in the inability of defense suppliers to provide materials
and components for defense weapons.
165. H.R. 2624, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
166. H.R. REP. No. 399, supra note 72, at 6.
167. Id. at 16.
168. Id. at 9.
169. Id. at 9.
170. Although such assurances have been provided to the CFIUS under the current EFA, the
CFIUS does not have the power to solicit or enforce such assurances. Id. at 8.
171. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
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In addition, each individual transaction referred to CFIUS would have
been subject to an initial examination by a White House Science Advisor.
The Advisor would be appointed to identify all cases that involve technolo-
gies essential to the national security. 72 This may have forced the investi-
gation of transactions the President may have otherwise overlooked.
Absent judicial review, however, the Act did not compel action on such
matters.
The TPA was not passed by the 102d Congress. The introduction of
this bill, however, did represent a small step toward defining national secur-
ity interests. The analysis of national security was complicated by the Bush
Administration's opposition to bringing commercial and economic con-
cerns under review,173 coupled with an inability to clearly separate military
from civilian technology. 74 The changing political world also makes it dif-
ficult to determine "friendly" and "unfriendly" nations, and resulting
threats to national security.1 75
It is doubtful that the Act will be reintroduced in the present congres-
sional session.1 76 If the Act is reintroduced in its original form, however,
several problem areas remain. The lack of judicial review reflected a contin-
ued ability for presidential abuse of discretion; the President was still af-
forded the opportunity to investigate all referrals without a judicial check
on his final decision. As a result, Congress would again fail to provide ade-
quate restrictions. Therefore, although this proposed amendment to the
EFA is justified as an attempt to protect national security, it may have been
nothing more than a protectionist attempt to appease the brainwashed
American public.
2. Antitrust Considerations
It has also been suggested that the national security concerns could be
more adequately protected by adding an antitrust element to the national
security standard. For example:
[I]f the largest four firms (or four countries) control less than 50
percent of the market, they lack the ability to collude effectively even
if they wish to exploit or manipulate recipients. If they control more
172. Laney, supra note 148, at 148-49.
173. Id at 149.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 148.
176. See, eg., Congress Unlikely to Take 'Activist' Role in Foreign Investment Issues, Aide
Says, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. No. 33, at 138 (Aug. 18, 1993).
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than 50 percent of the market, they have the potential to coordinate
denial, delay, blackmail, or manipulation. 177
While the "4-4-50" rule described above would not place responsibility
for antitrust considerations upon the Justice Department, 17 1 it has been sug-
gested that increased enforcement of the current antitrust laws and stricter
antitrust guidelines would more objectively determine the legality of foreign
investments.17 9 While increased enforcement of the current antitrust stat-
utes is expected with Ann A. Bingaman at the helm of the Justice Depart-
ment's Antitrust Division, it is doubtful that FDI will be discouraged in the
process.10
3. New Technology Protection Statutes
Another concern over merely restricting the ownership of U.S. compa-
nies is that:
Rejecting the foreign acquisition may simply mean that the foreign
company remains offshore, where U.S. authorities have the least
clout over its operations, from which position it can undermine the
U.S. domestic-owned competitor or consign American industries to
using second-class products if U.S. authorities use trade protection
to prop it up. 18
Therefore, "[t]he need for high-tech legislation was an important ele-
ment of the Democratic congressional agenda in the Bush Administration,
and a Clinton-Gore campaign plank with vocal business support."' 82 The
proper tool to eliminate such effects has not yet been determined, but Con-
gress is now attempting to find a remedy for the situation through means
separate and apart from the EFA.
One such measure is the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act
of 1980, which was amended on June 14, 1993.183 The purpose of this bill
was "to contribute to the competitiveness of the United States by enhancing
the Department of Commerce's technology programs."'' 8 4 This bill, in its
current form, would require U.S. companies to "(1) 'agree' to promote the
177. Moran, supra note 147, at 65.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. A New Direction for Antitrust Enforcement: The New Chief ofJustice's Antitrust Division
Makes It Clear That Theories of Economic Efficiency Will Not Trump Vigorous Competition, RE-
CORDER, Sept. 1, 1993, at 8, available in LEXIS, News Library, PAPERS File.
181. Moran, supra note 147, at 65.
182. Schwartz & Caplan, supra note 78, at 5.
183. H.R. 820, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
184. Id. § 202 (proposed amendment to Section 301 of the Stevenson-Wydler Technology
Innovation Act of 1980) (amended at (1988)).
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manufacture within the U.S. of products resulting from supported technol-
ogy and (2) 'agree' to procure parts and materials from 'competitive United
States suppliers.' "I" It includes the National Outreach Program, grants,
and other educational aspects, which are expected to encourage domestic
research and development efforts. 186
While the Act is therefore expected to increase the amount of technol-
ogy research conducted in the United States, it also limits the transfer of
that technology, whether the corporation is domestic or foreign owned. It
is uncertain what impact this bill will have upon current industry but as the
bill is universally applied to both domestic and foreign owned corporations,
it appears to be on the right track; the Act provides two assurances that the
level of technology will not be reduced. Through the enhancement of cur-
rent methods and preservation of both new and existing technology, the Act
appears to be in the best interests of national security advocates, without
providing a discretionary means of enforcement that can be skewed by fluc-
tuations in public opinion.
In addition, this Act would enable the states to encourage continuing
investment in local communities. By ensuring that technological advances
in manufacturing remain in the U.S., this Act would protect U.S. jobs and
ensure continuing economic support for their local economies. Whether
this bill becomes a law or other similar legislation arises, Congress will
clearly pursue this type of legislation until it becomes a permanent part of
U.S. policy.
V. CONCLUSION
The inability of the Clinton Administration to commit to a strict free
trade stance is representative of the current dilemma sweeping the country.
Congress needs to reiterate its free trade stance and provide a consistent
policy to ensure that uniform standards are maintained. Although the ex-
ecutive branch has declared its objectives concerning both inward and out-
ward foreign investment, congressional attitudes have not been consistent
with those of the executive branch. Usually, the more visible congressional
positions are opposed to some specific form of FDI, and although no purely
protectionist legislation has passed, legislation is occasionally introduced to
limit it. As a result, the overall congressional view can be classified as sup-
porting some form of managed trade when national security is a concern.
However, failure to agree on the level of such management has resulted in a
185. Schwartz & Caplan, supra note 78, at 8 (citation omitted).
186. H.R. 820, supra note 183 § 204 (proposed amendment to Section 303 of the Stevenson-
Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980).
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federal government that appears neutral in its views. Such neutrality could
be dangerous. If changes in legal attitudes are significant, they could con-
ceivably cause changes in the U.S. legal and regulatory environment. As a
result, legal treatment of direct foreign investment must be changed. It is
important that the federal government honor its constitutionally imposed
responsibility and present a stable foreign investment policy that can react
to short term political and social sentiments without violating long-term
U.S. policy goals. In the process, such a policy would eliminate the need
for state-imposed regulations and avoid the escape of technology necessary
for a stable U.S. economy.
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